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Pacta Sunt Servanda Versus the 
Social Role of Contracts: the case of 
Brazilian agriculture contracts
Christiane Leles Rezende1 e Decio Zylbersztajn2 
Resumo: Este estudo explora a instabilidade criada por decisões jurídicas con­
traditórias relacionadas às quebras contratuais. O mercado a termo representa 
uma importante fonte de recursos para o financiamento da agricultura Brasileira, 
no entanto, durante um período de aumento de preços da saca de soja no 
mercado spot, aconteceram muitas quebras contratuais. Foram realizadas análises 
descritiva e econométrica utilizando 161 decisões judiciais de segunda instância 
(Apelações) e foi realisada uma pesquisa quantitativa com 70 produtores de soja. 
Os resultados mostraram larga dispersão entre as decisões dos juízes, bem como 
a existência de efeitos de segunda ordem, tais como maior exigência de garantias 
e a redução do número de contratos. Aqueles produtores que não quebraram seus 
contratos também foram negativamente afetados com as estratégias adotadas 
pelas empresas de processamento e comercialização. O conceito de “Função social 
do contrato” introduzido no Código Civil do Brasil está associado à elevação 
da instabilidade nos contratos, aumento nos custos de transação, bem como, a 
adoção de sanções econômicas.
Palavras-chaves: agronegócio, contratos, decisões judiciais, soja.
Abstract: This study explores the instability created by contradictory court decisions 
related with contract breaches. Forward marketing contracts represent an important source 
of resources to finance Brazilian agriculture, however a large number of contract breaches 
were observed during a period of marked increase in soy prices. The study analyzed 161 
judicial appeal decisions and a survey was carried with 70 farmers. The results show the 
difference of judges’ interpretation and the existence of second order effects. The effects of 
court decisions were more requirements of guarantees and the reduction in the number 
of contracts. Those soybean farmers who did not breach their contracts have also been 
negatively affected by the strategic reactions of trading and processing companies. The 
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1. Introduction
The recent development of Brazilian soybean 
production took place, based on complex forms 
of credit provided by traders, such as forward 
contracts of sales and anticipated s contracts (green 
soybean contract). The motivation of this study is 
the observation of frequent contractual breaches 
during periods of scaling prices generating 
lawsuits between farmers, traders and crushers. 
Courts decisions have been too volatile inducing 
secondary effects leading to strategic reactions of 
economic agents.
Forward contracts of soybean are charac­
terized as a term contract. The objective is to 
transact ex­ante part of the soybean production 
to be harvested in the following crop year. The 
contracts are similar to loans that allow farmers 
to pay for inputs in advance. Another objective 
of the contract is to allocate risk of price variation. 
This modality of contracts seems to be preferred 
to the use of future contracts in the Commodity 
Exchange. Therefore, parties entering into 
forward sale contracts have multiple objectives, 
namely avoiding the risk of price fluctuations 
and financing the farmers production. From an 
economic point of view, at least two elements – 
risk and credit – are part of the transaction.
The 2003 and 2004 crop seasons were 
particularly problematic since the price at the 
harvest was higher than the price contracted ex­
­ante motivating a large number of contractual 
breaches between soybean farmers and 
industries3, leading to legal disputes. Preliminary 
interviews indicated that there was a concen­
tration of the problem in Brazilian central states. 
This perception was confirmed by the sheer 
volume of lawsuits filed in the state of Goiás.
The Brazilian legal system received influence 
by the French and German systems. Pillars of this 
code included the absolute concept of ownership, 
property and contract intangibility. The expression 
“pacta sunt servanda” means that breaching pacts 
were inadmissible when done freely and among 
equals (SANTOS, 2004). Nevertheless, the Article 
421 of the Brazilian Civil Code states: “The 
freedom to contract shall be exercised within 
reason and within the limits of the social function 
of the contract”. The limits of the social role of 
contracts have not been expressed in the code, 
leaving large room for interpretations. This study 
raises evidences that the loose interpretation of 
the new legal term has weakened the institute 
of contracts, opening room for multiple 
interpretations and providing grounds for the 
annulment of contracts. Since contracts provide 
mechanisms to control instabilities, secondary 
effects are expected to arise.
Based on the doctrine of the social role of 
contracts, we observed that most appeal decisions 
were initially favorable to farmers. Based on 
interviews, we also observed that most industrial 
establishments and trading houses reduced the 
number of soy forward contracts in subsequent 
3 Industries are used in this paper to represent the buyers of 
soybean by contracts.
concept of “social function of the contract” introduced in Brazilian civil code led to a higher degree of instability in 
contracts, raising transaction costs and motivating private economic sanctions.
Key-words: agribusiness, contracts, judicial decisions, soybean.
Classificação JEL: L14, K41.
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years. This may have been due to a drop in 
soybean prices, which provided companies with 
alternatives for soy purchasing, or due to contract 
insecurity; the latter hypothesis being the object 
of our study. Finding the motivation of each 
actor involved in the conflict may assist future 
improvement of contractual arrangements.
The core objective of this study is to identify 
how the breach of soybean forward contracts 
and subsequent legal decisions have affected the 
strategies adopted by agents in the soybean agri­
business system. In the pursuit of this objective, 
a structured field research has been carried out.
The theoretical framework is based on 
transaction cost economics and institutional 
environment analysis. The New Institutional 
Economics toolset considers, among other facts, 
that in the presence of positive transaction costs 
institutions may be inefficient, with negative 
implications for economic agents (NORTH, 1990). 
This study adopted the following procedures:
•	 Description of the fact (breach of contract); 
•	 Identification of dispute resolution 
mechanisms;
•	 Analysis of the instability in the economic 
environment.
A review of literature is presented followed by 
the theoretical framework, and by the description 
of relevant aspects of the Brazilian Civil Code. The 
third section of the article outlines the statistical 
analysis of State Court of Justice rulings. The 
fourth section presents the results of the effects 
of judicial decisions on economic instability, and 
which affect agents in the soy complex. Finally, 
conclusions are presented in the fifth section.
2. Soy agribusiness system  
and forward contracts
The Brazilian soybean agribusiness (grain, 
meal and oil) accounted for US$11 billion in 
exports revenue for the year 2007. Brazil’s output, 
of 60 million metric tons, places the country as the 
second largest among the world’s soy producers 
(CONAB, 2009).
To finance the activity several alternatives 
to traditional farming credit have been devised. 
One such alternative is the forward sale of the 
production through so­called “green soybean 
contracts”. From 1990 onwards, these contracts 
ensured the sale of supplies and provision of 
credit to farmers in exchange for soybean that is 
expected to be harvested in the next crop. Such 
forward contracts later became popular not as a 
manner to finance supplies, but as a price­setting 
mechanism, in order to reduce the impact of price 
fluctuations at harvest time4. 
When a contract involves advance payment 
– that is, when one party performs a contractual 
obligation by making an advanced payment 
or providing supplies to farmers –, farmland, is 
required as collateral. Usually, however, collateral 
for these contracts involves the issuance of Rural 
Product Bonds5.
In the 2003/2004 crop season, soybean 
growers have made forward contracts selling 
their produce for an average of US$ 10 per 
60­kilogram bag6, however, prices reached US$ 
17 at harvest time. The price rise offered an 
incentive to farmers not to honor the contracts, 
selling elsewhere for a higher price. Farmers and 
industry faced a post ­contractual conflict that 
affected coordination of the soybean agribusiness 
system, as evidenced by a decline in the volume 
of forward contracts observed in the following 
crop season.
The agribusiness system is defined as a crop 
specific sequence of interconnected transactions 
carried to producing, transforming, and 
distributing the product. Systemic analysis is 
broader than the production chain concept, and 
focuses the coordination mechanisms in addition 
to technological, and economic relationships. 
4 The model was severely impacted by the economic crisis 
observed in 2008.
5 The Rural Product Bonds (Cédula de Produto Rural ­ CPR) is a 
bond issued since 1994 to facilitate the use of cash forward 
contracts in the agricultural sector. It allows farmers to 
purchase supplies by offering their production capacity as 
collateral to credit or financing providers.
6 The 60­kilogram sack is the customary Brazilian unit for 
soybeans. It is equivalent to 2.2 U.S. soybean bushels.
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In agribusiness system analysis the institutional 
structure of production plays a central role 
(ZYLBERSZTAJN and FARINA, 1999). 
The soy agribusiness system therefore 
involves farming supply industry, farmers 
and growers, soy traders in direct contact with 
growers (trading houses, brokerage houses, 
cooperatives, and grain elevators), soy crushing 
establishments, grain distributors, and end 
consumers. Transactions are influenced by the 
institutional environment, which involves the 
legal system when it comes to issues such as 
property rights and environmental regulation, 
among others.
According to Jank (2004), growers who 
contracted forward with industry and traders 
adopted an efficient mechanism to obtain credit. 
Such a transaction allows the farmer to control 
the risk of price fluctuations. Forward contracts 
account for 25% of soy sold in Brazil, and are 
apparently preferred over the use of exchange­
traded futures.
2.1. Uncertainty and institutional environment
The review of literature seeks to provide more 
in­depth discussion of the role of the institutional 
environment in reducing uncertainty, particularly 
concerning the influence of the judicial system 
on economic relationships. Whereas traditional 
economic theory studies markets and considers 
the firm as a cost­minimizing production 
function, indifferent to its internal structure and 
to all external conditions (except for prices), New 
Institutional Economics approach to agribusiness 
coordination considers the internal structure of 
the firm, its vertical and horizontal relationships 
as a the institutional structure of production 
(ZYLBERSZTAJN, 1995).
In 1937, Ronald Coase’s landmark article The 
Nature of the Firm opened the door to study of 
the firm focused on its internal organizational 
aspects and on its relationships with clients and 
suppliers. In another article, The Problem of Social 
Cost (1960), Coase states that institutions would 
only be rendered unnecessary if information 
asymmetry did not exist and if transaction costs 
were nil. As such, a situation is inconsistent 
with the real world, firms play a crucial role in 
allocating resources.
The institutional environment is a matrix of 
formal and informal governance mechanisms 
that determine the rules to be followed and the 
control system to be set up. The manner in which 
the institutional environment is structured may 
interfere directly with production and transaction 
costs. North (1990, p. 3) considers institutions to be 
the “rules of the game” in a society, as they are the 
constraints that “structure incentives in human 
exchange, whether political, social, or economic”. 
Institutions “consist of both informal constraints 
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes 
of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, 
property rights). Throughout history, institutions 
have been devised by human beings to create 
order and reduce uncertainty in exchange” 
(NORTH, 1991, p. 97).
Williamson (1996) states that the core function 
of the institutional arrangement is to reduce the 
costs of contracting, monitoring performance, 
organizing activities, or adapting to agents’ 
efficient responses to the transaction problem. 
Secondly, the institutional environment is a set 
of rules that establish foundations for the market, 
and, depending on structure, may decrease 
or increase transaction costs for organizations. 
Institutions are therefore important and warrant 
analysis. 
Transaction cost economics set behavioral 
assumptions such as bounded rationality and the 
existence of opportunism. Bounded rationality 
is a natural characteristic of human beings, that 
is, it is impossible – or unmanageably costly 
– to obtain and/or process all the information 
required for decision making (drafting a contract, 
for instance) without leaving room for the other 
party to take opportunistic action. According 
to Zylbersztajn (1995), opportunistic behavior 
is more than the result of individual actions 
in the pursuit of self­interest. As stated by 
Williamson (1985) it is defined as seeking self­
­interest with guile. Someone may have privileged 
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information on the reality of another agent and 
use it opportunistically, raking advantage of the 
situation to make a profit.
Klein et al. (1978) point out a real possibility 
of post­contractual opportunistic behavior 
following the creation of appropriable quasi­
­rents, that is, when the likelihood of gaining 
from opportunistic behavior increases. There 
are costs and benefits to breach of contract, 
argues Klein (1992). Within the self­enforcing 
range, each agent will assess whether gains will 
exceed the cost of legal and economic sanctions. 
Legal sanctions are defined in the contracts 
themselves, usually as fines, and are judicially 
enforceable. Economic sanctions are unwritten, 
but nonetheless important, particularly those 
that affect the agent’s future relationships, such 
as damage to reputation.
Watanabe (2007) discusses the theory 
of efficient breach. According to the author, 
breach of a contract is efficient when the benefits 
produced by not performing exceed the loss. She 
does, however, note that damages are difficult to 
measure, particularly when agents are part of an 
agribusiness complex (farmers and agricultural 
suppliers, for instance). In addition to pecuniary 
losses incurred by the agricultural industry, which 
has obligations to other agents in the agribusiness 
complex, Watanabe argues that farmers’ future 
relationships may be harmed due to a damaged 
reputation; renegotiation is therefore preferable 
to breach in the long term.
The case of soybean farmers shows that price 
rises observed after the contract encouraged 
contract breach. The theory suggests that future 
relationships are expected to be hampered, with 
potential economic loss.
According to Arruñada and Andonova (2005), 
the adequate functioning of a market economy 
requires effective tutelage of the freedom of 
contract. Wealth creation depends on trading, and 
trading transactions require that their terms are 
properly defined and that uncertainty regarding 
adherence to those terms has been controlled – 
that is, rules and courts are necessary. The role 
of courts is to fill the contractual “gaps” – which 
are assumed as being incomplete – therefore 
reducing agents’ transaction costs.
Nevertheless, all rulemaking is subject to 
inefficiency, due to the presence of self­interest, 
incomplete information, and bounded rationality. 
Both legislators and judges may fail in their duties 
because of private interests, and even in the 
absence of such interests, may fail in identifying 
which rules are most appropriate to each case 
(ARRUÑADA and ANDONOVA, 2004).
Arida et al. (2004) claim that in countries 
like Brazil debtors are seen as hypo­sufficient 
agents that deserve protection. According to the 
authors, this is probably due to highly unequal 
distribution of income, which came together 
with historical and economic factors to create a 
strong “anti­creditor” bias. The authors also cite 
data from a Brazilian survey that consisted of 
members of the judiciary presented to situations 
in which they would have to choose between 
upholding a contract and rendering a socially 
“fair” judgment. Results show that 7% of judges 
considered that contracts must be enforced 
independently of their social effects, while 61% 
responded that the judge has to perform a social 
function and the quest for social justice justifies 
decisions in breach of contracts.
2.2. New directions of contract Brazilian law
Brazil is a civil law jurisdiction. The 
dominant characteristic of civil law, also known 
as continental or Romano-Germanic law, is the 
codification of the formal rules (SZTAJN and 
GORGA, 2005). According to Santos (2004), many 
civil law countries based their legal systems on 
the French civil code. Pillars of this code included 
the absolute power of ownership and property 
and contract intangibility. The Napoleonic Code 
was developed in a time characterized by the 
pursuit of individuality, equality, and liberty. The 
principle of pacta sunt servanda was dominant in 
the Code, as one’s word, given in agreement, 
simply had to be kept. Breach of pacts entered 
into freely and among equals was considered as 
being an exception.
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After the reform of the civil code, the Article 
421 stated that the freedom to contract shall be 
exercised within reason and the limits of the 
social function of the contract. According to 
Reale (2004), a prominent Brazilian jurist who 
mentored and coordinated drafting of the Civil 
Code concluded in 2005, the social function of 
the contract is expected to adapt to the “social 
function of property” principle. The design of a 
contract and performance under its terms are not 
only in the best interest of contracting parties, but 
also of society as a whole.
The law has been interpreted with different 
lenses, one being that it undermines the 
guarantees available to contracting parties. 
Reale (2004), however, claimed that the New Civil 
Code is not in conflict with the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda. He claims that the “social function 
of the contract” is imperative and establishes that 
contracts cannot be used in support of abusive 
activity that would cause damage to the other 
party or to third parties. The debate around 
these interpretations runs around the fact that 
always contracts have played a social role, always 
contracts have been considered fragile in cases of 
unbalanced domain on information and uneven 
market power.
Legal intervention may clearly be necessary 
in certain cases. However, reviewing or nullifying 
established contracts may cause an increase in 
uncertainty – and, consequently, in transaction 
costs – to all agents.
3. Dispute prevention  
and resolution mechanisms
During the development of the present 
study, private mechanisms of dispute prevention 
and resolution have been identified. Private me­
chanisms for dispute prevention and resolution 
may be formal or informal. Alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms can defined in the 
contract or informally defined.
Farmers who chose to maintain their contracts 
claimed they did so in order to safeguard their 
reputations. The soy market involves yearly 
renegotiation, and growers fear retaliation – in 
the form of economic sanctions – on the part 
of purchasers in negotiations subsequent to a 
contract breach.
In long­term contractual relationships, 
sanctions for breaching contracts does not 
necessarily depend on a third party: as actions 
in such relationships are self­controlled, 
punishment may consist on the termination 
of the relationship. Therefore, if one party 
breaches a contract, he fears to be punished by 
the other party, who will refuse to continue the 
negotiation for the next crop season. The decision 
to cooperate is based on current and future value 
of the relationship, reputation being a signal of 
future contractual problems (BAKER et al., 2002).
According to interviewees, in cases involving 
advance payment, most lawyers advised farmers 
to perform under the contract, as they believed 
the courts would rule in favor of the buyer. This 
demonstrates that, when property rights are 
clearly defined, the judicial system “signals” out, 
leading to a lower demand for litigation. Formal 
mechanisms of conflict resolution are based on 
court decisions. Large number of cases generated 
lawsuits filled by farmers and purchasers/traders 
seeking a definition of property rights.
The analysis of dispute resolution me­
chanisms is based on a survey carried in a sample 
of the State of Goiás Court of Justice in Brazil. 
This survey analyzes 161 appeal decisions in 
cases concerning breach of soybean forward 
contracts. Descriptive statistical and econometric 
causal analyses have been carried out.
Data collection on appeal decisions was 
conducted online, initially at the websites of the 
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Table 1. Decisions of the Goiás Court of Justice by Civil Chamber.
Civil Chamber
Decisions in favor of
Total
Grower Buyer
1st
N 36 2 38
% 94.7% 5.3% 100%
2nd
N 1 32 33
% 3 % 97% 100%
3rd
N 40 8 48
% 83.3% 16.7% 100%
4th
N 7 35 42
% 16.7% 83.3% 100%
Total
N 84 77 161
% 52.2% 47.8% 100%
Source: primary data statistical analysis.
Brazilian state courts from: Goiás, Mato Grosso, 
Mato Grosso do Sul, and Paraná. Only civil 
appeals of cases involving breach of soybean 
sale and purchase contracts were considered7. 
The only state in which there were enough cases 
meeting the sample criteria to provide accurate 
comparison of rulings was Goiás; as interviews 
also suggested a greater number of contractual 
conflicts occurring in the state, we decided to 
limit the analysis of lawsuits filed in the Goiás 
Court of Justice. We conducted online searches 
for rulings up to September 2007. During the 
study period, we collected detailed data on 161 
decisions, the earliest from November 2003 and 
the most recent from August 2007.
The court decisions analyzed in this study 
are related to the Civil Appeals, known in the 
Brazilian legal system as appeal decisions. 
The first analyzes about the rulings revealed 
that there is heterogeneity on appeal decisions 
from Goias Court of Justice. This information 
was the motivation to identify witch variable 
has more probability to influence on the judge 
decision. Obviously, a large number of variables 
could influence the judge decision, the majority 
of than could not be measured, like beliefs, 
7 Interlocutory appeals and motions for attachment were 
not included. Appeals only partially granted have not 
been considered at the study sample, as well as those with 
pending procedural issues, as they were not representative 
of an eventual court decision on the merits of the case.
psychological aspects. We tested the variables 
that were available on the lawsuits and variables 
related the profile of appeal court Judges, as 
explained in the next items.
3.1. Descriptive statistical analyses
Once received by the Court of Justice, each 
process is randomly allocated to a Civil Chamber8. 
In Goiás Court of Justice there are four Civil 
Chambers each composed by five or six Appeal 
Court Judges.
Table 1 shows how many lawsuits from the 
sample have been decided by each Civil Chamber.
The data presented in Table 1 suggests that 
judges on the soy forwards contracts conflict 
are divergent in terms of decisions. Seeking to 
understand the diversity of opinions on similar 
conflicts, the arguments presented in the appeal 
decisions have been analyzed. Judges may 
present a variety of arguments supporting their 
decisions. Some simplification was necessary 
in order to quantify the frequency of such 
arguments. In order to attain our goal we 
decided to choose the main argument that best 
represented each judgment. 
The selected arguments were:
For Appeal decisions in favor of farmers:
8 This assignment is meant to balance out the individual 
chamber caseload and prevent appellants from choosing 
the panel before which their case will be judged.
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•	 New orientation of contract theory, based 
on the social role of contract.
•	 Illegitimacy of Rural Product Bond.
•	 Theory of unforeseeable circumstances.
•	 Consumer Protection Code.
For Appeal decisions in favor of the industry 
(buyers/traders):
•	 Inapplicability of the theory of unfo­
reseeable circumstances.
•	 Legitimacy of Rural Product Bond.
•	 Inapplicability of Consumer Protection 
Code.
In the sample, 75% of rulings in favor of 
farmers have been based on arguments grouped 
under “new direction of contract theory”, that 
is, those based on the principles of the social 
function of the contract, good faith, and economic 
balance, as provided for in articles 421 and 422 
of the Brazilian Civil Code. The argument most 
frequently presented in rulings favoring buyers/
traders was that the theory of unforeseeable 
circumstances did not apply. In 92% of these 
cases, judges decided that the change in prices 
could not be considered unforeseen, so it did not 
constitute ground for contract termination.
Most Judges (64%) voted consistently in 
favor of growers or in favor of buyers in 100% of 
the cases. This evidence motivated the search for 
common characteristics to either trend. 
The sample has the following characteristics:
•	 Appeal Court Judges decided 87% of cases 
and substitute judges decided 13%.
•	 Twenty­one Appeal Court Judges were 
involved in the rulings studied, ranging in 
age from 44 to 69.
•	 Time on the bench varied; the most senior 
Judge had commenced in the Goiás State 
Court of Justice in 1998, and its most recent 
members joined in 2007. 
•	 Appeal Court Judges may be promoted for 
three reasons – seniority (which accounted 
for 32% of promotions in the sample), merit 
(other 32%), or administrative decision (36%).
•	 Most Appeal Court Judges (71%) were 
from Goiás. The remaining 29% were from 
neighbor states of Tocantins (14%) and the 
Southeastern states of Minas Gerais, São 
Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro (5% from each).
The first Supreme Court decision on soybean 
forward contracts was released on February 
20069. This decision and the following ones have 
maintained the original contracts. We found 20 
relevant Special Appeals and only 8 decisions. 
It is a small number, however, it is possible to 
observe a growing body of jurisprudence in favor 
of enforcing such contracts. This trend explains 
changes in judge decisions after February 2006, 
as detailed in the next section.
3.2. Econometric analysis
In addition to the descriptive statistics, a 
limited dependent variable model was adopted, 
with court decisions at several levels as dependent 
variables: 
•	 Appeal decision;
•	 Individual vote by Judge; 
•	 Individual vote by Appeal Court Judge.
The sample is composed of 161 appeal 
decisions from the Goiás Court of Justice10. Each 
appeal decision is composed by the vote of 
three judges. By the analysis of the full text of 
the judgments, the name and the vote of each 
judge was identified, making it possible to look 
for characteristics common to judges associated 
to each decision. 
The Department of Human Resources of the 
Goiás Court of Justice provided information about 
the profile of appeal court Judges. Particularly: 
9 REsp 722.130/GO, DJ 20/02/2006. In Brazilian case citation, 
REsp is an abbreviation of Recurso Especial (Special Appeal). 
DJ stands for Diário da Justiça, the official Brazilian law 
reporter. It is followed by the date of publication of the 
ruling or opinion.
10 Abstracts of appeal decisions were available online for 
all cases. The full text of the judgment, containing a brief 
report of the case, the name of judges and their vote 
was also available online for 77 cases, and 64 have been 
accessed directly from Goiás Court of Justice in Goiânia. 
It was not possible to obtain the full text of 20 decisions, 
which were in process of digital compilation and were 
therefore unavailable to consult.
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•	 age; 
•	 year of commencement at Goiás Court of 
Justice; 
•	 vitae, including the Judges promotion from 
the City level (First Instance) to Court of 
Appeal, whether based on professional merit, 
time or other criteria; State of origin11.
Court decisions on these cases have been 
considered as having a binary outcomes. They 
could take on one of two outcomes: favorable 
to enforcement of the contract or not, favoring 
farmers. The ruling or Court decision is modeled 
as a binary variable (LDV).
Values were as follows:
y 1 Favorable to enforcement of contract
0 Favorable to annulment of contract
= =
=
' 1
A probit model was used to measure the 
extent to which each explanatory variable affects 
the probability of the contract being enforced, 
ceteris paribus, as shown in Equation 1:
....P ruling x x x x1 0 1 1 2 2 n n;= = + + + +b b b bU^ ^h h [1]
A total of 161 rulings have been analyzed in 
three different models (A, B and C)12, as following:
Model A
Model A comprises 161 observations. 
This regression has the Appeal decision as its 
dependent variable. The model is as follows:
•	 Dependent variable: Appeal decision 
(Dummy: enforcement of contract=1; 
termination of contract=0); 
•	 Explanatory variables:
 ♦ Goiás­based company (Dummy: Yes=1; 
No=0);
 ♦ Contract involved advance payment or pro­
vision of supplies (Dummy: Yes= 1; No= 0);
 ♦ Year (decision) (2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, or 
2007);
11 As the greater number (71%) is from Goiás, this information 
has not been included in the econometric model.
12  All subsequent analyses were conducted in the Stata 
software package, version. 
 ♦ Unanimous decision (Yes=1 or No=0);
 ♦ Oral argument defended by farmer’s 
lawyer (Yes=1 or No=0);
 ♦ Oral argument defended by buyer’s 
lawyer (Yes=1 or No=0);
Based on the theory, we have hypothesis for 
the variables: “Contract involved advance payment 
or provision of supplies” and “Goiás­based 
company”: When the farmer received payment 
in advance, either money or supplies from the 
buyer, it is considered transference of property 
right of the soybean to the buyer. According the 
legal theory, the origin of the company should not 
influence the judge’s decision.
The other variables were available in the 
process files: Year of decision, if the decision 
of three judges was unanimous, if the lawyers 
made oral defense of his client. The basic idea is 
to check whether the oral defense has significant 
impact on judge decisions.
Model B
Model B contains 419 observations. It in­
cludes the vote and argument of each of the 
three judges that compose the council, including 
the ones who dissented from the decision13. This 
sample seeks to test, through the influence of the 
following variables on a judge’s individual vote:
•	 Dependent variable: Individual vote by 
Judge;
•	 Success: Enforcement of contract; 
•	 Independent dummy variables: 
 ♦ Position (Court Appeal Judge =1 or 
Substitute Judge=0);
 ♦ Gender (Male=1 or female=0); 
 ♦ Unanimous decision (Yes=1 or No=0);
 ♦ Oral argument by farmer’s lawyer (Yes=1 
or No=0);
 ♦ Oral argument by buyer’s lawyer (Yes=1 
or No=0);
13 The full text of the judgment was unavailable for 20 of the 
161 Civil Appeals. As neither individual votes nor arguments 
underpinning the decision could be tabulated for these 
cases, they were removed from Sample B, which therefore 
contains 419 observations on the votes of 42 judges.
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Table 2. Expected signals to the independent variables of model A, B and C.
A B C
Advance payment/ supplies + + +
Goiás­based company
Year of decision +
Unanimous decision
Oral argument (farmer’s lawyer) ­ ­ ­
Oral argument (buyer’s lawyer) + + +
Position
Judges Gender
Decision postdates the first Supreme Court decision + +
Year of commencement at Court of Appeal
Judges Promoted merit
Source: primary data statistical analysis.
 ♦ Contract involved advance payment or 
provision of supplies to grower (Yes=1 or 
No=0);
 ♦ Decision postdates first Supreme Court 
decision (>02/2006) (Yes=1 or No=0).
As the dependent variable is the individual 
vote by Judge, the variables “position” and 
“gender” were included in sample B. When the 
Appeal Court Judge has some impediment to 
vote, a substitute judge is called. In this sample 
13% of the votes were under the responsibility of 
substitute judges.
In this sample, we included the variable 
“Decision postdates first Supreme Court decision” 
to identity the influence of the first Supreme 
Court decision about this conflict on the Judge’s 
vote after February 2006.
Model C
The same procedure was adopted, the 
dependent variable being the vote of only Appeal 
Court Judges14. At this time we included variables 
related to their personal characteristics, like year 
of commencement at Court of Appeal and if the 
promotion was for merit or for other reasons. The 
sample consisted of 303 observations. The model 
considers the following variables:
14 The vote of substitute judges were excluded.
•	 Dependent variable: Individual vote by 
Appeal Court Judge 
•	 Success: enforcement of contract
•	 Independent variables:
 ♦ Year of commencement at Court of Appeal;
 ♦ Promoted for merit (Dummy: Yes=1 or 
No=0);
 ♦ Unanimous decision (Dummy: Yes=1 or 
No=0);
 ♦ Oral argument by farmer’s lawyer 
(Dummy: Yes=1 or No=0);
 ♦ Oral argument by buyer’s lawyer (Dummy: 
Yes=1 or No=0);
 ♦ Contract involved advance payment or 
provision of supplies to grower (Dummy: 
Yes=1 or No=0);
 ♦ Decision postdates first Supreme Court 
decision (>02/2006) (Dummy: Yes=1 or 
No=0).
Based in the theory, the expected signals are 
presented in Table 2.
The probit regressions have been designed to 
test the hypothesis. The model permit to identify 
the effect that the explanatory variables have on 
the probability of judges decisions. Table 3 shows 
the results of regressions.
In Model A, variables Contract involved 
advance payment or provision of supplies and year of 
decision reached statistical significance. The data 
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Table 3. Probit analysis of Appeal decisions.
Variables Model A Model B Model C
Advance payment/supplies 0.990*(0.534)
1.496***
(0.312)
1.480***
(0.415)
Goiás­based company 0.232(0.227)
Year of decision 0.290**(0.114)
Unanimous decision ­0.0960.267
­0.386**
(0.165)
­0.616**
(0.247)
Oral argument (farmer’s lawyer) ­0.2560.355
­0.193
0.194
­0.086
(0.236)
Oral argument (buyer’s lawyer) 0.334(0.319)
0.384**
(0.165)
0.571***
(0.210)
Position 0.503***(0.194)
Gender 0.316(0.196)
Decision postdates the first Supreme Court decision 0.395***(0.132) 
0.427***
(0.165)
Year of commencement at Court of Appeal 0.218***(0.048)
Promoted for merit 0.441**(0.185)
Constant ­582,044 (229,590) ­0.783(0.247)
­436,432
(97,009)
N 161 419 303
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses.
Source: primary data statistical analysis.
Table 4. Probability of ruling in favor of contract enforcement for the years 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, or 2007,  
ceteris paribus.
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Appeal Decision=1 25 % 35 % 47 % 58 % 69%
Source: primary data statistical analysis.
confirmed our hypothesis: when the contract 
involved advance payment or provision of 
supplies, the transference of property right of the 
soybean is clear: The probability of decision be in 
favor of contract enforcement was 82%, versus 
47% when payment is not made in advance.
Data also suggest that the probability of the 
contract being upheld increased steadily through 
time. Yearly probabilities may be found in Table 4. 
This result indicates that a convergence effect is 
expected as more decisions are published.
Model B presents judges’ individual 
vote instead of the committee’s decision, as 
dependent variable. The following variables 
were found to be significance to explain the 
decisions: Contract involved advance payment 
or provision of supplies, unanimous decision, oral 
argument presented by company lawyer, Position of 
Judge (Court Appeal Judge or Substitute Judge) 
and Decision postdated the first Supreme Court 
ruling. As indicated by the coefficient sign, 
unanimity of decision was the only significant 
variable negatively correlated with a judge’s 
vote to uphold the contract. Estimated 
probabilities are displayed in Table 5.
The results indicate that rulings by Appeal 
Court Judges are more likely to favor enforcement 
of the contract than those by substitute judges. 
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Table 5. Probability of a judge voting in favor of contract enforcement according to value of the variables: position, 
unanimous decision, oral argument by buyer’s lawyer, advance payment or provision of resources, and decision 
postdating or predating first Supreme Court ruling on the matter, ceteris paribus.
Significant variable Probability with value = 0 Probability with value = 1
Judge’s Position 30% 49%
Unanimous decision 59% 44%
Oral argument (buyer’s lawyer) 44% 59%
Advance payment/ provision of supplies 42% 90%
Decision postdates first SC decision (Feb ’06) 40% 56%
Source: primary data statistical analysis.
Table 6. Estimated probability of an appellate judges voting in favor of contract enforcement according to value of 
the variables.
Significant variable Probability with value = 0 Probability with value = 1
Promoted for merit 37% 54%
Unanimous decision 63% 39%
Oral argument (buyer’s) 38% 60%
Advance payment/ provision of supplies 39% 88%
Decision postdates first SC decision (Feb ’06) 37% 53%
Source: primary data statistical analysis.
Table 7. Probability of an Appeal Court Judge who joined the Court in 1998, 2000, 2002, 2005, or 2006 voting in 
favor of contract enforcement, ceteris paribus. 
Year of Commencement at Appeal Court 1998 2000 2002 2005 2006
Vote=1 14% 26% 41% 67% 74%
Source: primary data statistical analysis.
On the other hand, the probability of a result 
favoring enforcement of the contract was lower in 
unanimous opinions than it was in opinions where 
judges dissented. The likelihood of a favorable 
judgment also increased, from 44 to 59%, when the 
buyer’s lawyer made an oral argument during the 
judgment. The variable most likely to change the 
outcome of the decision was whether the contract 
involved an advance payment or provision of 
supplies. Contracts involving forward payment 
were 90% likely to be enforced on appeal, while 
contract modalities not involving such payment 
(or provision of supplies) were only 42% likely to 
be upheld by the court. 
After February 2006, when the Supreme Court 
issued a ruling in favor of enforcing a soybean 
forward contract, Judges were more likely to rule 
in a similar manner (56%, versus 40% before the 
SC decision). This result expresses the effective 
signaling effect of superior courts.
Sample C featured the individual vote of 
Appeal Courts Judges as its dependent variable. 
Variables reaching statistical significance were: 
Contract involved advance payment or provision of 
supplies, unanimous decision, oral argument presented 
by company lawyer, Decision postdated the first 
Supreme Court ruling, year of commencement at the 
Appeal Court, and promotion for merit. Estimated 
probabilities for each variable value (0 or 1), ceteris 
paribus, may be found in Tables 6 and 7. 
Appeal Court Judges promoted for merit 
appeared more likely to rule in favor of enforcing 
contracts. We observe 54%, versus 37% for those 
promoted due to seniority or administrative 
decisions. The unanimous decision, oral 
argument, advance payment, and year of decision 
variables shown similar results as they did in the 
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model B, it was expected, since 87% of cases were 
decided by Appeal Court Judges.
Another relevant factor was the year of 
commencement at Appeal Court: the probability 
of upholding contracts increased steadily with 
more junior judges – those who joined the Court 
in 1998 had a 14% chance of ruling in favor of 
farmer, while those who joined the bench in 2006 
were 74% likely to decide in favor of enforcement 
the contract.
4. Effect on stability of  
the economic environment
After identifying the conflict and the results of 
court decisions, this section seeks to present some 
of their effects on the economic environment. This 
part of the study is based on qualitative interviews 
with farmers, entrepreneurs, lawyers, and trade 
association representatives. The objective is to 
identify a profile of farmers and purchasers, 
in order to add context and depth to study of 
the sector, and particularly to identify the main 
perceived challenges to contract performance, as 
perceived by real players. Meetings with small 
groups of players, meant to provide suggestions 
and validate preliminary results. After two 
years, industry representatives were once again 
interviewed in order to gather evidence of sector 
instability following the court decisions. 
Results of the qualitative analysis were used 
to devise a roadmap for farmers data collection, 
seeking to identify some specific variables, 
namely: Contract characteristics; changes related 
with contract incentives and penalties over 
the preceding three years; whether strategies 
adopted by soy purchasers were altered after 
breach of contract episodes and subsequent court 
rulings; and, finally, to identify private conflict 
resolution mechanisms arose from these events.
Seventy questionnaires were applied, to 
soy growers who made at least one forward 
sale during the three harvests preceding our 
study (2002/2003, 2003/2004, and 2004/2005). 
The survey considered the regions that have 
relevant soybean production in Brazil15. 
Questionnaires have been applied from 
September through November 2005.
In a workshop16 attended by farmers, 
entrepreneurs, and legal professionals in June 
2005, soy farmers reported as effects of breach 
of contract: a decrease in soybean purchases and 
a temporary disappearance of forward contract 
offers. Another consequence of conflicts between 
growers and buyers was the credit reduction and 
subsequent reduction in rural output; according 
to workshop participants, government credit is 
simply not enough to maintain production levels. 
This analysis is superficial and does not control 
for other possible causes, like price decline effects.
The survey of growers considering contracts 
signed in 2002/2003, 2003/04 and 2004/05 harvests 
pointed out a drop of 44% fixed­price contracts 
between the 2003/04 end 2004/05 harvests. There 
was also a reduction in those involving advanced 
payment, but to a lesser extent. Contracts 
involving supply advances remained constant. 
In the survey, growers were asked about the after 
effects of breach of contract episodes; Table 8 
shows the consequences as reported by growers. 
Half of farmers interviewed claimed that credit 
collateral requirements were more stringent in 
the 2005 harvest, 46% stated that negotiation with 
buyers became more difficult, and 30% entered 
into fewer forward contracts.
Most companies interviewed claimed no 
longer to adopt fixed­price forward contracts 
without advance payment or provision of 
supplies. They did claim to continue using 
contracts involving advance payment and 
provision of supplies and resources, as, according 
to company representatives, few courts ruled in 
favor of their annulment. The empirical portion 
of this study confirmed this result. 
15 The sample was balanced by states as follows: 68% came 
from the state of Goiás, 15% from Mato Grosso, 13% from 
Paraná, and 4% from Rio Grande do Sul, Mato Grosso do 
Sul, Bahia, and Maranhão.
16 Conducted at the Federal University of Goiás School of 
Agronomy in Goiânia.
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Table 8. Effects of breach of contract on soy growers.
Consequences of other farmers breaching their contracts % growers
More stringent collateral demands from lenders 50%
Negotiation with buyers is more difficult 46%
Less forward contracts as compared to previous harvests 30%
Less resources available to finance harvest 27%
No appreciable effect 19%
Reduction in farmed area 11%
Reduction in grain sales 11%
Source: primary data statistical analysis.
5. Conclusions
Soybean forward contracts have proven to be 
ineffective as a mechanism to mitigate the impact 
of substantial price fluctuations. Companies 
interviewed claimed no longer to use fixed­price 
soybean forward contract, only those involving 
advance payment and provision supplies – 
and, even so, with reformulated credit criteria. 
Demands for collateral have become far more 
stringent, as has monitoring of rural output. 
Furthermore, credit is only offered to farmers 
holding a good financial position with a perfect 
reputation in the soy market. 
On interviewing soy growers and industry 
representatives, it has been found that forward 
contracts were widely used without restrictions 
until 2002/2003 and 2003/2004 harvests, at which 
time spot prices far exceeded those originally 
agreed upon, running opposite to the pattern of 
previous years. External shocks causes by high 
Chinese demand for soybeans and U.S. harvest 
losses, altered the contractual relationship, 
leading some growers to believe that breaching 
the contracts would be more advantageous than 
performing under their terms. Such farmers 
chose short­term profits over long­term gains that 
could have resulted from maintaining a strong 
relationship with the industry and soy traders. 
Other growers, however, felt unfairly 
punished by companies, which they claim 
responded indiscriminately to contract breaches 
and “lashed out” against all soy farmers, even those 
who had always honored contracts. According to 
interviewees, the number of breached contracts 
was quite small when compared to those honored. 
There is no consensus on an actual figure, which 
varies widely – between 0 to 70% – according to 
farmers’ perceptions.
Most farmers interviewed for the present 
study claimed to have suffered ill effects due to 
other growers breaching their contracts. The most 
oft­cited general consequences were companies’ 
greater demands for collateral, greater difficulty 
in negotiating with companies, and a reduction 
in the volume of traded forwards. According to 
growers and industry alike, this drop in forward 
trading was due to three reasons, namely: 1) low 
price of soy because of over supply; 2) growers’ 
expectations that prices would rise during the 
season, as they did in 2003 and 2004; and 3) 
contracts have been breached by growers in the 
two previous harvest seasons.
It was found that soy buyers and traders 
entered into fewer forward contracts in the year 
following the breach of contract episode than 
they had in the year before these events. It is 
unclear whether there is a causal relationship 
between this decrease and the judicial insecurity. 
The quantitative study of court decisions showed 
divergences even between Chambers of the Goiás 
Court of Justice. The data offers an example of the 
unpredictability of the Brazilian legal system.
Contracts exist as a means of reducing and sa­
feguarding against uncertainty; nevertheless, in 
these cases, contracts were fragile and unable to 
fulfill this purpose, largely due to an unstable insti­
tutional environment. Reduction in the number of 
forward contracts used by companies and traders, 
more stringent demands of collateral to ensure 
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performance under the terms of contracts, and a 
selection process used to screen which growers are 
less likely to breach them were put in place as pri­
vate conflict resolution mechanisms, but their use 
led to increased transaction costs for both parties.
The manner in which courts rule on breach of 
contract markedly affects organizational strategy. 
The results of this study are aligned with the new 
institutional economics theory, which states that 
institutional environment affects organizational 
transaction costs, and particularly influence their 
capacity to guarantee formal or informal con­
tracts. If the “rules of the game” (NORTH, 1990) 
are unclear to agents, the institutional environ­
ment is expected to generate uncertainty, increa­
sing the cost of subsequent transactions and the 
importance of economic sanctions.
The judicial system influences the business en­
vironment, as court decisions have repercussions 
in the actions of private agents. When a judge or 
justice rules in favor of one in a lawsuit, this pro­
duces secondary effects leading to a decrease in 
the use of contracts, which in turn makes future 
negotiations more difficult and complex for all in­
volved. In this case, companies become fearful of 
negotiation, as they are unable to rely on the legal 
system to ensure that contracts would be honored. 
This disregard for secondary economic effects of ru­
lings and decisions may be interpreted as “econo­
mic shortsightedness” on the part of the Judiciary. 
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